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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

BASIC AIMS
OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

STUDY

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
BY
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., and
S. Res. 31, 86th Cong.)

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PREFACE

By Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations

In January of 1958 the Committee on Foreign Relations decided to undertake a review of conditions and trends in the world and of the policies and programs of the United States with respect thereto. That review grew, in part at least, out of the concern of the committee over the impact which Soviet scientific achievements might have upon our ~~relations with the rest of the world.~~

~~From time to time throughout~~ the spring of 1958, the committee held public hearings on U.S. policies respecting the Far East, the Near East, south Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Canada. Those hearings were limited in nature and served primarily to focus attention on the principal policies and problems of the United States in its relations with the rest of the world. For the most part, the hearings were limited to receiving testimony from the principal officers of the Department of State concerned with various geographic parts of the world. The committee also sought the testimony of selected nongovernmental witnesses with special knowledge of the areas under examination.

The hearings during the spring of 1958, the focus given to our relations with Latin America as a result of Vice President Nixon's visit there, and, lastly the then critical situation in the Middle East, all contributed to the committee's belief that the time had come for an exploration in depth of U.S. foreign policies throughout the world.

As a consequence of these factors, the Committee on Foreign Relations, in an executive session on May 20, 1958, authorized its Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs to undertake a study of United States-Latin American relations. At the same time, the committee established a special subcommittee, consisting of Senators Green, Fulbright, Wiley, and Hickenlooper, and directed it to explore the feasibility and desirability of a broad study of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world.

Subsequently, this subcommittee reported to the full Committee on Foreign Relations that it was feasible and desirable that the committee undertake such a study of foreign policy. It was felt a study of this nature might serve to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the foreign policy of the Nation and lead to a better national understanding of international problems and to more efficient and effective administration of our international operations.

On July 15, 1958, the Committee on Foreign Relations voted to report to the Senate a resolution authorizing the study. The Senate adopted this resolution (S. Res. 336, 85th Cong., 2d sess.) on July 31, 1958. The resolution authorized the Committee on Foreign Relations to "make a full and complete study of U.S. foreign policy." Without limiting the scope of the study authorized, the committee was instructed to direct its attention to the following subjects:

1. The concepts which govern the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world, and the policies by which these concepts are pursued;
2. The present state of the relations of the United States with the principal nations and geographic areas of the world;
3. The administration and coordination of policies and programs by the Department of State and such other departments and agencies of the executive branch which engage in substantial activities abroad; and
4. The relationship of other policies and activities of the Government and private activity which exert a significant influence on the relations of the United States with the rest of the world.

In the conduct of its study, the committee was authorized to "use the experience, knowledge, and advice of private organizations, schools, institutions, and individuals * * *" and to "enter into contracts for this purpose." It was directed to complete its study by June 1960, and not to exceed $300,000 was made available to meet the expenses of the committee. The committee was authorized to continue this study by the terms of Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong., 1st sess.).

Shortly after Senate Resolution 336 was adopted by the Senate, Senator Green, then chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, designated me to serve as chairman of an executive committee, consisting of Senators Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken, which was given the responsibility for directing and coordinating the study.

On September 16 and 17, 1958, the executive committee discussed with a group of distinguished private citizens the general problems involved and the most advantageous approaches to them. Taking part in these discussions, besides the members of the executive committee, were Robert Bowie of Harvard University, former Ambassador William G. Bullitt, Robert Calkins of the Brookings Institution, John Cowles of the Minneapolis Star & Tribune, William Diebold of the Council on Foreign Relations, Henry Luce of Time-Life, Inc., Walter Millis of the Fund for the Republic, and Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Following these meetings the executive committee developed its plans and announced on October 15 that it was prepared to invite private research organizations and institutions to submit proposals on a series of 15 studies which the committee expected to have undertaken in connection with its examination of foreign policy. As a result of this announcement, the committee received over 50 proposals from organizations and institutions interested in undertaking one or more of these studies.

On January 5, 1959, the executive committee met again to consider the proposals which had been received and decided which organizations and institutions should be asked to undertake studies for the committee. Set forth below are the titles of the studies designated to be undertaken and the names of the organizations and institutions responsible for these studies.

STUDIES

The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of the United States in the World. Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y.

The Operational Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy. Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (Published as Study No. 6 on November 11, 1959.)

The Principal Ideological Conflicts, Variations Thereon, Their Manifestations, and Their Present and Potential Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge, Mass.

Worldwide and Domestic Economic Problems and Their Impact on the Foreign Policy of the United States. Corporation for Economic & Industrial Research, Inc., 1200 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. (Published as Study No. 1 in August 1959.)

Foreign Policy Implications for the United States of Economic and Social Conditions in Lesser Developed and Uncommitted Countries. Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on U.S. Strategy and Foreign Policy. The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, 1906 Florida Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States. Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif. (Published as Study No. 2 in September 1959.)

The Role of Multilateral Organizations in the Formulation and Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.

Formulation and Administration of U.S. Foreign Policy. The Brookings Institution, 722 Jackson Place NW., Washington, D.C.

U.S. Foreign Policy in Western Europe. Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. (Published as Study No. 3 on October 15, 1959.)

U.S. Foreign Policy in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. The Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Near East. Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., 27 East 62d Street, New York, N.Y.

U.S. Foreign Policy in South Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)

U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa. Program of African Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. (Published as Study No. 4 on October 23, 1959.)

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Conlon Associates, Ltd., 310 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. (Published in Study No. 5 on November 1, 1959.)

Each of these organizations and institutions will submit a study to the committee.

Broadly speaking, I hope these studies will supply essential background to enable the Committee on Foreign Relations to accomplish the following basic purposes:

1. Provide the Senate and the American people with a simple, understandable, and forthright statement of the basic foreign policy aims of the United States which reflect the motivations and aspirations of the American people.
2. Identify those forces, domestic as well as foreign, which now or in the future may tend to frustrate or to promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.
3. Suggest, and if possible, determine, feasible ways to deal with such forces so that they may promote the basic foreign policy aims of the United States.
4. Examine the impact of those forces and trends, foreign and domestic, upon the conduct of American foreign policy in the various geographic areas of the world.

5. Examine the foreign policy decisionmaking machinery to determine whether it is of the maximum efficiency consistent with our democratic processes.

At the January 5 meeting the executive committee also decided to send a letter to some 50 retired Foreign Service officers "to endeavor to obtain for the use of the committee the personal views of men of practical experience with respect to the foreign policy of the United States." Each of these retired Foreign Service officers was asked to give the committee his "general commentary on what is right with our policies, what is wrong with our policies, and what action (or inaction) might in your opinion best serve our interest in the future."

On June 15, 1959, the committee made public, in a summarized form and without personal attribution, the substance of the views of former members of the Foreign Service who responded to the letter. The views and attitudes expressed in that committee publication deserve the most careful consideration by officials in the executive branch of the Government, by my colleagues in the Senate, and by all citizens interested in the conduct of our foreign policy.

The study printed in this volume, "Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy," is the eighth of the 15 principal studies the committee expects to publish.

It was designed to help the committee find answers to subjects covered in an exchange of correspondence between representatives of the committee and representatives of the Council on Foreign Relations. A copy of the exchange of correspondence appears in the appendix (see p. 23–24).

I take this occasion to emphasize that the studies which are received will supply the committee with background material for consideration in preparing a final report to the Senate. The committee is, of course, free to accept or to reject the findings and recommendations of the organizations and institutions submitting studies. It is the function of the committee to evaluate the studies which are submitted. Prior to the preparation of a final report, the committee will hold public hearings to receive testimony from all interested parties. In that way it will be possible for the committee to test the soundness of the findings and recommendations in these studies before reaching its own conclusions and submitting its final report to the Senate.

In addition, I wish to emphasize that the committee is approaching this assignment in a nonpartisan manner, endeavoring to avoid transitory issues and to concentrate on the fundamental forces at work within and without the United States which must be understood if our foreign policy is to serve the Nation.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, N.Y., November 1, 1959.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I am pleased to submit to you the enclosed report entitled "Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy." This study, undertaken on the basis of an exchange of correspondence in February of this year between representatives of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, represents "Study I–A: The Nature of Foreign Policy and the Role of the United States in the World," referred to in the first interim report of the Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 31 (86th Cong. 1st sess.).

I should like to emphasize that under its rules the Council on Foreign Relations never takes a position on public issues; rather it provides a center in which people of many differing views examine the problems of our country's international relations. This report, therefore, should not be construed as representing the views of the Council as an institution. It is the result of the discussions of an ad hoc group which has held several meetings under the auspices of the Council. It does not represent unanimous agreement among the group's members upon all the points covered, but it does reflect the general thinking of the group and represents as near a consensus as possible among people of such diverse backgrounds and experience.

The following took part in the discussions: Frank Altschul, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Elliott V. Bell, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Robert Blum, Robert R. Bowie, Harlan Cleveland, John Cowles, Arthur H. Dean, John Sloan Dickey, Thomas K. Finletter, William C. Foster, W. Averell Harriman, Philip C. Jessup, Joseph E. Johnson, G. A. Lincoln, Henry R. Luce, James A. Perkins, I. I. Rabi, Herman B. Wells, Henry M. Wriston (chairman). In addition, the following members of the staff of the Council participated in the meetings: William Diebold, Jr., George S. Franklin, Jr., Walter H. Mallory, Philip E. Mosely. The report has been drafted by John C. Campbell, Director of Political Studies at the Council, with the advice and counsel of the members of the ad hoc group and taking full account of their views.

I hope that the Committee on Foreign Relations will find this document useful in preparing its final report to the Senate, and also in connection with its own thought and action on foreign policy in the years ahead. In preparing this report we wished above all to convey a sense of urgency and to stress the need for dedicating the Nation's full effort to broad and positive goals worthy of its traditions of freedom and suited to the unprecedented demands of tomorrow's world.

Cordially yours,

HENRY M. WRISTON.

BASIC AIMS
OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The Committee on Foreign Relations has requested "a broad analysis of the basic aims of U.S. foreign policy as they have developed historically, with an estimate of the extent to which those aims are supported by the American people, and with a projection of the role which the United States should play in the future if such basic aims are to be achieved." Because we consider the determination of goals and policies for the future to be of urgent importance, this report is directed largely to that part of the committee's request. The historical development of U.S. foreign policy is discussed briefly in the light of the challenges and the tasks which lie before the American people.

I. Historic Aims of American Foreign Policy

During the 19th century the basic aims of the American Nation, which are best expressed in the preamble of the Constitution, were shaped by its geographical position on what had been a virtually empty continent, by its urge for rapid growth, by the nature of its free institutions, and by a sense of destiny and of difference from the old world. Its foreign policy was directed largely to ensuring the Nation's ability to grow in freedom and to carry through its expansion to the Pacific. Two historic policies supported that basic purpose: the policy, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, of preventing non-American powers from establishing themselves in the Western Hemisphere, and the concomitant avoidance of involvement in the alliances and conflicts of the great powers of Europe.

Although insulated by geography and by these policies from the politics and wars of the major powers, the United States was no hermit state. It was a part of the Western World, of the international community of that time. It stood for freedom of the seas, the free exchange of ideas, and freedom for its citizens to trade and to do business abroad without discrimination. It stood for respect for international obligations and the promotion of peace through techniques of negotiation, arbitration, and judicial settlement. It stood also—and this made the United States a revolutionary influence in the world of that time—for the right of all peoples to national and individual freedom, a principle which has remained ever since a salient element of America's attitude toward the world.

Human Rights

Foreign policy in practice, of course, rarely corresponds fully to broad statements of aim and principle, for it must be based also on calculations of national interest in the specific circumstances in which decisions are made and actions taken. American concern for the cause of freedom abroad was an aspiration which colored national attitudes rather than a concrete objective engaging the Nation on behalf of popular revolutions all over the world. Nevertheless, the example of America as a working democracy served as a symbol of freedom, and the boldness of its declared position unquestionably exerted a significant moral and even political influence beyond its borders. Thus, when the United States came onto the world stage in the First World War and the peace settlement which followed, it was a great moral force as well as a principal member of the victorious Allied coalition.

That war was a turning point in American history. The prospect of a German victory had threatened to demolish the protective hedge behind which we had been able to concentrate on cultivating our own garden. By its intervention in 1917 the United States showed that its weight could be thrown onto the scales to prevent an aggressive power from gaining dominance in Europe—a consideration which again came into play when Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union presented a similar threat. By the time of the First World War, moreover, the United States had become so large, productive, and potentially strong that it was bound to be a major factor in the world balance.

The two main elements in President Wilson's program—a just peace settlement based as far as possible on self-determination, and a world organization for collective security—were basically consistent with historic American attitudes, even though the American people were not ready after the war to accept the responsibilities of full participation in world affairs. After the 20-year interval between the two wars had demonstrated the futility of isolation, they again turned to those two goals. America's peace aims in the Second World War, expressed in a series of congressional resolutions, official statements and international agreements, envisaged a just and stable peace settlement, a world organization to keep the peace through collective security and to protect human rights, and a set of international economic arrangements and institutions that would insure maximum trade, set up safeguards against crisis, and encourage economic growth.

The American people accepted the fact that the United States must play a leading role in the postwar world. They have continued to accept it. But the conditions under which those responsibilities have to be carried out have brought new and unprecedented challenges. Some became apparent as early as 1945; others later. The magnitude of the responsibilities, both of American leadership and of the Nation as a whole, is driven home to us every day.

II. The Conditions of the Postwar World

The choice for responsible and continuing participation in world affairs was one of the great decisions in the history of our country. From it came the establishment of the United Nations, America's leading role in the world's recovery from the destruction left by the war, and the sense of purposeful commitment to the principles of freedom and justice for which the American people had fought.

It soon became apparent, however, that the new world order was not going to be orderly at all; that forces of tyranny and aggression were active in a new quarter of the globe; that many new and revolutionary forces were making themselves felt; that both the American people and those specifically charged with the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy would have to develop a greater understanding of the nature of those forces; and that new "great decisions" would have to be made. The major developments of the past 15 years, though familiar to many, need to be recalled to mind in order to illuminate the aims, and the needs, for the future.

1. The combination of great power and expansionist ambitions represented by the Soviet Union—to which were added by 1949 the European satellites and Communist China—has posed the threat that this massive agglomeration of power would continue to expand into other areas and threaten the security of the United States itself. Violating its agreements, the Soviet Union refused to restore their independence to the Eastern European states its armies had overrun in the course of the war. It converted temporary lines of occupation into rigid territorial barriers separating the Communist from the non-Communist world. It maintained vast military power and subjected other states to threats and pressures aimed at territorial changes or political submission. It refused to agree to a peace settlement which would end the division of Germany, and without a settlement on Germany no stable settlement for Europe as a whole could be achieved. Confident of the ultimate victory of communism throughout the world, the Soviet leaders have followed a persistent and dynamic policy of expansion. They have used a variety of means, including, in the case of Korea, direct military aggression by satellite forces. While Soviet tactics vary from time to time, mixing blandishments and talk of peace with threats, the world has no reason to count on basic changes or on internal developments that will weaken the economic, political, or military power of the Soviet regime or change the main direction of Soviet policies.

2. China, which the United States hoped to see a strong and friendly ally, has come under Communist domination, except for Taiwan and a few small islands remaining under the control of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Mainland China has risen rapidly since 1949 from a position of near helplessness to one of great strength under the direction of a Communist regime allied with the Soviet Union and from the start deeply hostile to the United States. Its policies toward many countries on its borders, some of them closely associated with the United States, have been overbearing and aggressive, and in one case (Korea) it deliberately embarked on open warfare against United Nations forces under American leadership.

3. The conflict which came to be known as the cold war has proved beyond the capacity of the United Nations to prevent or control. Because of the basis on which the organization was established, action to check aggression or threats to the peace rests on the unanimity of the great powers, a condition which has seldom been attainable since 1945. Thus there has been no international authority through which the principle of collective security could be made consistently effective against direct or indirect aggression on the part of the Soviet Union or Communist China. The United Nations did play a significant role, however, in certain of the postwar crises, in support of that principle: in Korea, where it assumed responsibility for the military operations taken under American leadership to resist aggression; in the Suez crisis, where resolutions of the General Assembly led to the cessation of military action by Britain, France, and Israel, and the

U.N. Emergency Force helped in the liquidation of the affair; and in a number of cases involving nations other than major powers where the authority of the United Nations was exerted to bring an end to hostilities. The Uniting for Peace resolution and the work initiated by the Collective Measures Committee at least opened the possibility that the United Nations might be able to take effective action in spite of a veto in the Security Council. But in facing the realities of the postwar period the United States and other nations have had to look primarily to regional groupings and to policies of self-defense in order to find ways of protecting the free world.[1]

4. Western Europe, an area vital to the security of the United States and linked to it by common values for which both had just fought, was in a state of great weakness in the early postwar years. By themselves the Western European nations could not regain their economic health, nor could they maintain their security except through new forms of association among themselves and with the United States. As a result of far-reaching measures of recovery and cooperation begun under the Marshall plan and with the establishment of NATO, Western Europe has registered a remarkable growth in productivity, strength, and cohesion. Despite this considerable progress, the overall strength and unity of Western Europe continue to be hampered by conflicts of national policies and of economic interests, evident for example in the unsettled economic relationship between the six nations of the European Economic Community and the other nations outside it.

5. A revolution has taken place in the former colonial and less developed areas of Asia and Africa. Many new nations have won their independence, with others sure to follow; the drive for independence in Africa is much stronger and more rapid than was expected. These nations have acquired a special importance in world affairs for a number of reasons: strategic location, large and growing populations, resources (such as oil), their insistence on rapid economic development, and above all the magnitude of their own problems, to which the rest of the world cannot be indifferent. Political stability has been hard to achieve, as the exercise of self-government proved a more complex task than the attainment of it. The working out of new relationships with the industrial countries has been a particularly difficult process on both sides. Attitudes stemming from the past relationship of dependence did not easily disappear, especially at a time when Communist powers were making strong and not unsuccessful efforts to extend their influence into these areas. Endeavors of the United States to establish a basis of cooperation with the Asian and African nations have been complicated by its association with the former colonial powers, by local conflicts such as the strife over Palestine, and by wide differences of view on the nature of the Communist threat and what to do about it.

6. Latin America, although outside the main theaters of the cold war, has been beset by political and economic instability and by the problems of adapting its institutions to rapid social change. It is apparent that the attitudes and policies of the United States may be crucial in determining whether the growth and travail of the Latin

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[1] The term "free world" is often used to describe the entire area not controlled in its basic foreign policies by Moscow or Peiping and will be so used in this report. These peoples live under all sorts of institutions. But they are all free (including Communist Yugoslavia) of Soviet or Chinese Communist domination.

American countries will be a controlled revolution taking place without disruption of the inter-American system and the Atlantic community, or whether they will become the scene of uncontrollable unrest and cold-war competition.

7. The gradual shift from possession of an atomic monopoly toward a position of virtual nuclear parity with the Soviet Union deprived the United States of a significant military advantage. It could no longer regard its massive striking power as so effective a deterrent to aggression or as a guarantee of victory at acceptable cost in the event of the ultimate test of war. The growth of Soviet nuclear power, together with the maintenance of huge conventional forces in the Communist bloc, has compelled the United States and other free nations to be prepared for a wide variety of military moves the Communist powers might make, from the fomenting of civil conflict to the launching of all-out war. Because of the need for a global military posture adequate for deterrence and for the necessary operations if deterrence failed, the United States has had to sustain a peacetime military effort of unprecedented size and cost and has also sought new relationships with a large number of countries based on common efforts for mutual security.

8. The pace of technological change led to weapons of such destructive power that both the United States and the Soviet Union have had to consider whether the arbitrament of total war could be accepted even as the ultimate means of preserving vital interests and national security. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, however, have taken their place beside other weapons within the existing scheme of world politics, which is in essence a conflict between two great blocs over the control or denial of territory, involving on both sides an intricate complex of strategic plans and calculations, fears, warnings, commitments, and considerations of prestige. Thus, while the possession of the means of massive destruction by both sides has produced a situation of mutual deterrence, total war remains a real possibility, whether resulting from a direct military challenge to the territory of one bloc or the other, miscalculation, or a local conflict which could get out of control. The Soviet refusal to accept an adequate system of inspection and control has made it impossible to reach agreement on an international system of arms limitation which would reduce or eliminate these terrible prospects. But the United States can take little comfort in assigning blame for the deadlock to the Soviet Union. The urgency of finding some means to control nuclear weapons and other armaments remains.

9. In addition to its application to weapons, the march of science and technology is rapidly changing the environment in which all nations live, without necessarily respecting or conforming to the political and other relationships which have grown up over the centuries. The accelerating pace of change has upset traditions, created new demands, encouraged revolutionary ferment. It affects what nations want and what they can or cannot do. Increasingly, their problems have gone far beyond handling as matters of purely national policy. The interdependence and interpenetration of societies requires reassessment of what is meant by such terms as sovereignty and nonintervention. Governments find themselves dealing primarily with complex situations, with wide-ranging political and economic forces, not just with relations with other governments. Man's ven-

tures into space call into question existing legal and political concepts. Such problems as are involved in the production and use of the world's resources of energy and raw materials have forced many nations, including the United States, to face new choices on how to work out relations with each other and with existing or new regional groupings, how to modify or expand international economic institutions, and whether to seek the basis of a new world order. Scientific advance, with its promise of plenty, brings not only new problems but great new opportunities.

III. The Role of the United States

The United States, new to the exercise of vast international responsibilities, has not found it easy to adjust to all these rapidly changing conditions. The fundamental principles of its historic approach to world affairs were surely relevant to the new situation, but its established policies, as well as many of the plans with which it emerged from World War II, were clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, the record of the past 15 years has been a creditable one. The Nation showed that it could adjust constructively to new conditions. At critical points the Government took and carried through, with the support of the people, major decisions which were bold in conception and salutary in their effect. Such were the original decisions of 1943–45 to take a leading part in setting up the United Nations, the decisions for aid to Greece and Turkey and for the Marshall plan in 1947–48, the resistance to Communist aggression in Korea in 1950, and the stand taken in the Suez crisis of 1956.

Many other ground-breaking steps were taken, providing the outlines of a national strategy. At the core of American policy has been the creation of a common front with likeminded nations of the Atlantic world, marked by the establishment and growth of NATO and by the reorganization and strengthening of the inter-American system. The peace treaty and security arrangements with Japan provided an anchor of free world security in the Far East. The chain of alliances, regional security organizations, and arrangements for bases—not all of them of equal importance from the standpoint of military security and some carrying political liabilities as well as benefits—was gradually extended to include other countries threatened by Communist imperialism. The United States, as the strongest power and the only one participating in all these alliances, thus became the leader of a worldwide coalition. A program of military aid has been developed to cement the alliances and to provide strength and self-confidence to the partners. In addition to the alliance system, the United States has taken the lead in building a wider network of arrangements for economic and technical assistance to numerous countries of the free world (both allies and neutrals), based on mutual recognition of a common interest in strengthening their independence against outside pressures and in fostering their economic progress.

Concentration on resisting the Communist threat, especially the military threat, has had its successes. Although Communist influence has increased in some areas, for all practical purposes the territorial expansion of the Communist world has been checked since 1949, save for the one breakthrough in North Vietnam which received international recognition in 1954. But the demands of the cold war, the need for meeting successive challenges at this or that point on the periphery of the Communist empire, have obscured many other demands which are bound to affect America's interests and role in the world of the future. They have also tended to divert attention from the formulation and pursuit of long-term policies without which we can see no clear outline of our future relations with other nations, and indeed no successful outcome of the cold war itself.

The record of the postwar period shows abundantly the difficulties and dilemmas which a democracy faces in playing a role of leadership in the contemporary world. A few of the critical issues have been clearly presented, and could be clearly decided. For the most part, the complex forces and situations with which the United States has had to deal require an understanding on the part of government and people and an efficiency in the process of policymaking which we are only beginning to develop. Unlike totalitarian states, the United States has no rigid doctrine, no dreams of empire, no dynamic strategy of expansion by force or subversion. Its concept of a legal international order justifies the use of force to resist aggression but not to engage in it. Concern for the opinion of other free nations and the real risks of war also serve to limit the dynamic nature of the policies the United States can adopt in directly challenging the Communist bloc within the territories it now holds. In that sense American policies have had a defensive character. But clearly the United States could have more dynamic and positive policies in the free world itself, where it does have more freedom of action and opportunity for leadership.

Here, too, there are real limitations, although they provide no excuse for passivity. World affairs are unpredictable, charged with dilemmas that appear to be, and may in fact be, insoluble in this generation. The United States cannot define for itself a single foreign policy that covers all countries and all contingencies. The choices cannot always be clear and consistent. Policy has to deal with the world as it is and as it evolves. It cannot rest solely on an idea of the world as we would like it to be.

Basically the United States relies on persuasion and consent in order to obtain the cooperation and support of others, and the fact is that nations of the free world often see the issues in a quite different light from the United States: they have their own interests, their own ideas on such matters as the relative importance of the Communist threat and the merits of participation in military alliances. Some of the conflicts within the free world go deep, and the United States has frequently found that it cannot act decisively in regard to them, especially when it is trying to retain or to win the cooperation and goodwill of all the contending parties.

Yet the instruments available for the exercise of leadership are considerable. The fact that those nations which seek a balance to Soviet power and security against aggression look to the United States as the nucleus of free world strength gives this country great influence. Its material wealth and productivity provide economic resources which weigh heavily in relations with other nations. And international leadership based on consent need not mean compromising our fundamental principles and policies. Such leadership makes heavy demands on the leader, but it promises solid and lasting results. It is a matter of finding common ground, for which America's own conduct, both international and domestic, is as important as the persuasiveness of its diplomacy.

When all the factors more or less inherent in the world situation are given their due, it still must be said that the United States has failed to cast its policies adequately for the long term. Part of the explanation may lie in defects in the machinery of policymaking, defects which can be corrected. Part may lie in the fact of the constitutional division of responsibility for foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches of the Government, which, besides requiring a special diplomacy of its own, tends to tie important policies and programs to the Procrustean inflexibility of the fiscal year. Yet fundamentally it is a question of attitudes, foresight, and leadership within the American body politic. The traditional division of powers does not preclude cooperation or prevent either branch from taking the initiative in developing such cooperation along new lines of foreign policy. The Senate, in particular, has shown itself on occasions in the past a source of fruitful ideas and approaches. While it should not take on itself the detailed planning and policy functions which lie within the province of the Executive, it can and should play a great part in leadership, especially in the guidance of public opinion, as it has at times of crucial decision; for example, in the Vandenberg resolution of 1948.

Whatever the reasons, the tendency of the United States up to now has been to treat foreign relations as a series of crises, of moves and countermoves in the cold war, in which the United States has attempted to combine firmness in holding the line against Communist expansion with measures to build up defensive strength in the free world and with a willingness to negotiate on outstanding issues. This will not be sufficient for the future. The great question is whether the United States can, concurrently, act decisively to meet the succession of threats and challenges from the Communist bloc as they arise and also add new dimensions to its foreign policy by taking measures aimed at the world's other problems and at the longer term future. Although the past few years have seen many Communist gains, as well as some setbacks, there has been nothing inevitable about it. Present conditions are as favorable to initiatives on the part of free nations as they are to those of the Soviet Union or Communist China. Opportunities to create conditions conducive to the growth of freedom in the world and to the establishment of a durable peace are there. The question is whether the United States will have the will and ability to seize them.

Long-term estimates and planning cannot safely ignore such subjects as the course of developments within the Communist empire over the next 10 years, the effects of China's growing power, the kind of relations the United States should aim to achieve with the Soviet Union over the long run, the growth of new international institutions, the future importance of nationalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and all the forces near or under the surface today which are likely to change the shape of the world's major problems over the next 10 years or so. Constructive planning should guide us not only in meeting the crises of the future but in doing now what we can to shape that future.

IV. The Tasks Before Us: Basic Aims and Policies

Because this group was asked to consider on a broad basis aims and policies for the future, its report should not and cannot run the whole gamut of problems all over the world, go into the details of individual questions, or make specific recommendations on the pressing issues of the day. Its purpose is rather to show the nature and diversity of the problems and opportunities ahead and the magnitude of the efforts required to meet them in facing the future with hope and confidence. We are aware that aims and principles are empty of content unless sustained by performance, and that the real tests come in the field of specific policies and concrete action. But the general direction must be set if the policies are to have meaning.

A. BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

First and foremost, the United States must have a broad, basic aim which responds to the deep aspirations of the world's peoples as well as meets the challenge from the Communist bloc. Such an aim is the building, jointly with other free nations, of a new international order.

A new world is in the making. We know that the Communist powers will do everything they can to shape it to their will. Whether they can be prevented from doing so depends in large part upon the United States. We know also that the United States will have opportunities to exert a more positive influence. For most peoples of the world this is an age of change, of liberation, of promise and of hope. If America has no aims that go beyond maintaining the status quo, it will fall short of fulfilling its full promise. Only creative policies, acts which catch the imagination of people everywhere, will lead to a world in which nations can live free of alien domination and in which the security and growth of our own society and that of others can be assured.

It is obvious that the policies to support such aims cannot be conceived and carried out purely as national policies of the United States or as a crusade for the American way of life. The search for national fulfillment in freedom and its continuing enrichment becomes a search for an international order in which the freedom of nations is recognized as interdependent, and for which policies must be jointly undertaken by various nations of the free world. Those policies should be such as to make of the free world a going concern in the success of which all peoples have a stake.

The free world, of course, is made up of many different nations with wide variations in their institutions, their aims, and their attitudes. But broad common interests, most of which are stated in the United Nations Charter, do exist and can be built upon, without requiring a rigid, uniform approach to all. There is room in such a cooperative international community for states with differing political, economic, and social systems, including states which profess or wish to be Socialist. Indeed, the close cooperation of states whose economic systems bear different labels can help to discredit the false thesis that the cold war is a struggle between socialism and capitalism instead of between Communist imperialism and the right to freedom. Success in such common endeavors may also be the most promising means by which the free world can increase pressures within the Communist bloc for less dangerous and more accommodating policies on the part of the Communist regimes.

Central to any consideration of the future is the question of security and the preservation of peace. By force of circumstance the United States and other nations associated with it have not been able to rely solely or principally on the United Nations; for they have seen that the world organization, whose power only reflects the will and ability of member states to make use of it and to adapt their national policies to the purposes and principles of the charter, cannot reach decisions or order action that will either prevent or defeat an aggression launched against them. They have had to safeguard their security through bilateral agreements and regional arrangements, with their own military power serving as the deterrent to aggression against them. This alliance system, perhaps not in the precise forms in which it has grown up but certainly in its main elements, remains essential to the free world's security. It must be held together on a basis of mutual interest. The potentialities of the United Nations, however, are also of the greatest importance.

While the United Nations has not been the cornerstone of American foreign policy as was first hoped, it does embody the ideal of collective security which the American people have so strongly held since its founding in 1945. It surely must be our purpose to maintain it, to strengthen it, and to help it gradually to acquire more authority. This is a test of our capacity for leadership. There may be many matters on which the United Nations will provide the obvious or only seat of authority to oversee or to enforce agreements which may be reached. Agreed limitation and control of armaments, for example, will have to be policed by a body acting under international agreement. Where the United States can get Soviet cooperation to use and strengthen the U.N. machinery for this and other purposes, so much the better. Where it cannot, it should still use all opportunities to work with free world countries to the same end.

More effective use of the judicial organ of the United Nations—the International Court of Justice—is an obvious and necessary means of building a better international order. The ideal of a world under law, a goal which reflects America's own experience and its longstanding convictions, can best be approached through strengthening the prestige and the authority of the one judicial body of worldwide membership. Clearly the first step, for those nations, including the United States, which originally accepted the jurisdiction of the court only with reservations concerning matters they deem to be domestic, is to withdraw those limitations on their participation in the processes of judicial settlement.

The United Nations has performed, and should continue to perform, many useful functions: as a forum to sound out or rally world opinion, as a channel for negotiations with friends or adversaries, and as an instrument for resolving the disputes of nations willing to respect the charter. As the countries of the free world seek closer ties among themselves, they should find that the United Nations, time and again, affords means to settle differences, to coordinate policies, and to undertake joint schemes of mutual aid, cooperation, and development.

Because the specialized agencies of the United Nations may be especially suited to such efforts, the United States should seek every opportunity to use them and to support their activities, while working to overcome the existing proliferation and overlapping of their functions and to make them more effective channels of international action.

B. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

A theme which runs through the American outlook on the world since far back in our history has been the common heritage of Western civilization. Two world wars and especially our experience since the second have left no doubt that the future of America is tied to that of the Atlantic community, which includes Western Europe and the entire Western Hemisphere. However we view the future, it is hard to imagine America's place in the world other than in close association with its partners in Europe, in Canada, and in Latin America.

Many of the decisions to be taken in determining the Atlantic community's own destiny will revolve around questions of organization. At present the principal organs, of prime importance for security, are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States. There is every reason to strengthen them in every possible way. But it is essential to retain a flexibility of approach. For purposes other than security, such as the growth of economic cooperation, other organizations may prove more effective. The boldness of some of the steps taken thus far should not inhibit even bolder thinking on such questions as how fast and how far Western Europe should move toward integration, in what ways the United States should be associated with that process, and what closer ties should link Europe, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Latin America.

It is the substance rather than the form of solidarity that is crucial. While the national framework may often provide the best means of rallying support for common interests, the United States must exert its influence against the destructive effects of national parochialism, including its own. It must strive to prevent the crystallization of rival or conflicting blocs within the Atlantic Community with vested interests in division rather than in unity.

The solidarity of the Atlantic nations, however, is not exclusive. It should not represent, or appear to represent, a common front against non-Western nations of the free world. It is rather a means by which nations which value freedom can serve the general cause of freedom.

C. THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

Vital decisions lie ahead also in the relationships between the industrialized countries of the free world (principally North America, Western Europe, and Japan) and those countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which are less developed. For a long time to come the latter will experience revolutionary conditions, problems of an economic growth which lags behind popular expectations, and in some cases an ominous population explosion. The economic and technical assistance programs carried on by the United States over the past decade represent a recognition of those problems and a start on attacking them. For the most part, however, they have been a mixture of emergency measures, palliatives, and efforts to strengthen allies for primarily military reasons. Most of those measures have been necessary and useful. In meeting current emergencies the economic instruments of policy are frequently the most available and the most effective. But the need for a more ambitious, longer term, and more pointedly direct approach, on a basis that is broader than U.S. programs alone, can clearly be seen.

There must be movement of capital goods from the industrial to the less developed countries going well beyond the present volume; a massive effort to build up technical and administrative competence; action to correct or minimize the effects of drastic swings in the prices of certain basic commodities, a matter of special importance to Latin America; and urgent planning on how to tackle the population problem in the areas of rapid growth before it reaches the proportions of disaster. It is in the interest of the entire free world to have some of the less developed countries, soon, reach the point of breakthrough to self-sustained development. Western Europe and Japan can and should share in these efforts to a much greater extent than hitherto. But their contribution is not a substitute but a supplement to our own, which must also be greater than in the past.

The necessary decisions for large-scale assistance to the less developed countries should not be made contingent on an agreement to reduce armaments that would free funds for that purpose. If the assistance is necessary and desirable—and it is—the advanced countries should provide it without regard to the progress achieved in limiting armaments by international agreement.

The political problems will be as formidable as the economic. Many of the new and less developed countries have no early prospect of stability either internally or among themselves. Some have hardly jelled as nations. Their leadership often resorts to the emotional appeals of nationalism as a substitute for statesmanship. Serious barriers still stand in the way of cooperation with the West, some of them the result of policies in areas such as the Middle East and south Asia which Western nations considered necessary for security but which unfortunately injected them into local political conflicts and alienated those who sought a neutral position in relation to the cold war. Such policies deserve searching reappraisal.

Where the colonial issue still remains, as it does in some parts of Africa, and even in areas where relations of dependence have been liquidated, it presents special difficulties for the United States because of our ties with the colonial powers in Europe and the risks of a lasting alienation from the new nations. The essence of successful diplomacy on such issues will be the avoidance of absolute choice between Europe and Africa and the promotion of a peaceful transformation of relationships which prevents such choices from arising. Because the peoples of Africa are determined to achieve self-government, it is dangerous for the United States to be associated in their minds with policies which seem to have the effect of denying it to them. Fortunately, practically all the European powers concerned have now shown a spirit of farsighted accommodation and statesmanship, a fact which should offer greater opportunities for America to participate in the urgent task of helping Africa's progress in freedom.

The less developed and the advanced industrial countries need each other. There is a sound basis of partnership. The task is to find and strengthen political relationships based on mutual respect, as the underpinning of common economic, educational, and other endeavors. The Western nations and Japan have to keep a basic unity in policies toward the less developed countries, if only to coordinate assistance to them, but they must avoid any hint of neocolonialism. The goal should be to offer a partnership which appeals to those peoples and to their leadership as a positive and preferable alternative to "partnership" with the Communist bloc.

The advance of human welfare and standards of living on a broad front throughout the free world, commensurate with the advances in science and technology, can hardly proceed without new forms of cooperation. As in the case of the requirements for security, many problems will be too big to be dealt with on the old basis of negotiation among a great number of sovereign national states. Others will be less and less suited to the type of bilateral arrangement on which U.S. aid programs have been based. Long-range development is a broad world problem. Handling public aid primarily as a national proposition on the part of both donor and recipient tends on both sides to inject national policies and sentiments into the picture and thus to increase the political difficulties and jeopardize the hoped-for economic results. We know from experience that the granting or lending country becomes the natural target of criticism, no matter how large the programs may be.

Now that the other Western countries are in a position to join in the providing of aid, a multinational structure including both lending and borrowing states to carry out the necessary programs offers a means of increasing the total effort while avoiding the difficulties inherent in the bilateral method. It could be most helpful also in blunting the damaging political effects of the bilateral programs of the Communist powers. It makes it easier to tackle the economic problems on their merits without raising fears or wounding sensibilities on such issues as political strings, national sovereignty, and nonintervention. What advantages the United States might lose in giving up direct control of the expenditure of funds it should more than regain in sounder political relationships.

The multinational approach need not deprive the major providers of a voice, a very influential voice, such as they have in the International Bank and presumably will have in the International Development Association. Bilateral programs will continue to be useful in certain instances. But this group is convinced that the emphasis in the future should be on the multilateral approach.

The United States will have to look at the further possibilities of dealing with broad economic questions on the basis of regional authority (a process already begun in Europe) and on that of the expansion of the scope and powers of functional across-the-board institutions such as the specialized agencies of the United Nations, provided that they can be organized rationally and made to work efficiently. In such a basic question, for example, as the world's food supply and its distribution, America's great agricultural productivity is bound to be a major factor. American surpluses have been used to good effect as a means of helping people in critical need of food, and of transferring resources to less developed countries. Yet policies deriving largely from domestic considerations and carried out on a year-by-year basis are not sufficient. If our phenomenal farm production is to play its due part in the building up of the whole free world, the United States should be in the position of willingness to put it on the table as a matter of international discussion with other producing and consuming countries, and of seeking to work out with them the necessary long-range programs. This group feels that on such issues the United States must provide bold leadership, that it cannot shirk taking the broader view.

D. MEETING THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE: THE MILITARY NEEDS

Thus far, this report has emphasized the need for constructive decisions and policies adequate to the demands of the next decade as we can best foresee them. Foreign policy also has its demands of the present and the near future. Seen in the longer perspective, meeting the present and continuing challenge of the Communist regimes is only a part of the totality of the complex task ahead. But it is obviously a vital part. It is a means of buying time to achieve a higher level of sanity and order in world affairs. It lays on us certain minimum requirements of policy and action which must be met if this Nation is to survive and grow in freedom. We still have to hold the line against the expansion of the Communist empire. Further Communist territorial gains, with their inevitably wide and deep psychological effects, could mean a decisive shift in the world balance.

Some of those requirements are military. What the magnitude of the military effort should be cannot be stated with precision. This report is not primarily concerned with military estimates and planning but with the need for military power as the necessary condition for an effective foreign policy. The magnitude of the effort should be determined by military needs, determined as objectively as possible, and taking into account the needs and contributions of other nations associated with us. Obviously the allotment of national resources to military purposes cannot be made without regard to other demands on those resources or to the state of the national economy. Certain military requirements, however, are important enough to demand a margin of safety without which the Nation will be in grave danger; for example, the building up, maintenance, and protection of retaliatory power sufficient to make unacceptable to the Soviet and Chinese Communist leadership the cost of launching a major attack on the free world; the possession of mobile forces capable of selective use with those of other nations in a variety of situations, as a means of deterring aggression that is less than a major attack and of coping with it if it occurs; a research and development program which will insure all possible progress in science and technology that can contribute usefully to the military tasks of the future; and a long-range military aid program to strengthen the global defense posture of the United States and its allies, thus reinforcing strategic deterrence, the capacity for limited military operations, and the opportunities for effective political action.

It is the present policy of the United States, as this group understands it, to meet these vital military requirements, although we have serious doubts whether they are in fact being met. They are mentioned here in order to stress the absolute necessity of vigilance to see that they are met, firmly and with whatever sacrifice is necessary, in changing conditions over the years as the costs go up and the burdens grow heavier.

Military measures, however, will not provide security in any absolute sense, nor will they guarantee the attainment of national objectives or some kind of victory in the cold war. They are no substitute for foreign policy. Indeed, undue emphasis on the military aspects can be an obstacle to cooperation with nations important to us, and to the success of our military strategy. But a basic military posture must be maintained. It is the underpinning without which the other instruments of policy cannot be effective.

E. LIMITATION AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Progress toward disarmament through the limitation and control of armaments is made urgent by the growing destructiveness of modern weapons, the projection of military power into outer space, and the prospective spread of nuclear weapons among an increasing number of states. The nature of nuclear warfare has made the arms race, with its dangers of total catastrophe, a matter of commanding concern to the man in the street as to the expert and the statesman. Inevitably the idea of disarmament carries a strong appeal to the world's peoples living under those dangers. The whole process of working steadily toward a better world order has a certain unreality in men's minds when they live under the threat of seeing all civilization engulfed by a nuclear war.

These considerations make it imperative for the United States to conduct serious negotiations for international agreement on limitation, reduction, and control of armaments. Despite the negative results of 15 years of negotiation and the unhopeful prospect ahead, a negative or perfunctory approach to the subject on the part of the United States cannot be permitted. It would compromise American influence abroad, jeopardize the aims of our foreign policy, and produce repercussions which might well impair the confidence of the American people in themselves and in their leadership.

Even though it may be illusory and put forward for propaganda purposes, the Soviet proposal for complete disarmament has to be taken seriously and fully explored. The United States should give further and deeper study to concrete ways of attacking the problem: such aspects as the means of control, the successive stages of disarmament, and especially the possibilities of agreements involving mutual but not necessarily uniform or similar concessions on weapons, troop strengths, bases and positions; for it is in such practical trading, taking account of the dissimilarities in Soviet and Western strengths and positions, that the best chances for progress may lie.

These points will probably have to be dealt with in direct and secret negotiations with the Soviet Government, without neglecting adequate consultation with our major allies; but simultaneous discussions should be carried on with broader participation in the U.N. framework in recognition of the interest of all nations in this matter.

There are really no sound alternatives to negotiation. We cannot be content with indefinite continuance of the present situation. We cannot look forward with equanimity to an all-out arms race extending even into the unlimited realms of space. The American people have rejected, as they must, any solution through a so-called preventive attack. Likewise, they must not fall into the trap of accepting Soviet proposals lacking the indispensable provisions for inspection and control. The United States should, therefore, take the initiative and put forward new proposals of its own, seeking continuously and in every possible way to get agreement on limited aspects of the issue and on the stages of a general plan.

This group does not presume to propose any specific plan. We know of no plan which meets all the problems and would guarantee success if adopted. We wish here only to emphasize three general points which place the question in the context of the basic aims of American policy and should guide planning and negotiation on this subject: (1) The question of limitation and control of armaments is directly related to the new international order which the United States and other free nations must seek to build; such an order cannot be one dominated by an uncontrolled arms race and the threat of unlimited destruction. (2) Significant progress in the control of arms demands a sincere commitment to the concept of collective security and to the development, gradual as it may be, of a stronger international political structure, which is indispensable to any durable arrangement for inspection and control. (3) The inevitable risks involved in any proposals for the limitation and control of armaments should be weighed against the risks of failure to make any progress at all. The present state of affairs provides no such absolute security that the United States can afford to take refuge in an excess of caution in judging proposals, whatever their source, that offer a real possibility of progress.

Let us recognize, however, that the chances for agreement and tangible progress depend on the attitudes and policies of the Communist powers. The Soviet leadership may have reasons of its own for wanting agreement on some aspects of the problem, and this possibility we should not neglect. But the ideology and past conduct of the Soviet regime give little reason to hope for an enforceable general agreement. The United States cannot risk its own and the free world's security on unsecured paper promises or inadequate provisions of control to prevent violations. Moreover, even an effective agreement to stabilize armaments at certain levels would not remove the necessity for maintaining the military power necessary under the new conditions for the purposes already mentioned in this report. Reduction of armaments should not be regarded as the only or the principal avenue to peace. Armaments tend to reflect political conflicts. Settlement or attenuation of the conflicts should automatically reduce the dangers and burdens of the arms race; failure to settle them makes agreement on armaments terribly difficult if not impossible. Yet this country must not take the position that nothing can or should be done about this latter question until the political conflicts are resolved. It should proceed simultaneously on both fronts.

F. MEETING THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE: THE LONGER RANGE

Even should agreement on limitation of armaments prove possible, even if what Mr. Khrushchev says about disarmament, relaxing tension, and ending the cold war is taken at face value, this leaves no room for relaxation of effort on the part of the United States and other free nations. There is no present or prospective change in basic Soviet aims. The Soviet leaders believe history to be on their side. We cannot risk our future on the easy assumption that they are wrong. The peaceful competition which is offered demands all possible effort and sacrifice to meet it on the levels of diplomacy, economic policy, and political action. Whatever surcease the Soviets might gain from the arms race will mean increased challenges in these other fields. The rapid growth of the Soviet economy enables them to use trade and aid much more effectively than in the past as instruments to extend Soviet influence in parts of the free world.

Momentary relaxation of tensions holds out no promise of an end to the cold war. The Soviet leaders have shown that they can turn tensions on and off as it suits their own strategy. Their proposal to end the cold war is to end it on their terms, to consolidate their past gains, which the United States cannot formally recognize without betrayal of basic principles and serious loss of prestige and position, and to make the free world vulnerable to new thrusts in the future.

Acceptance of the challenge of the cold war as a long-term proposition compels the United States and the nations associated with it to maintain and to strengthen those policies already developed which are best suited to the competition, and to seek new policies which can gain maximum support in the free world to this end. The positive long-range policies already mentioned hold the promise not only of finding common ground within the free world for tackling its basic problems, but also of effective defense and the reduction of the proportions of the Communist threat. It is not possible at present to see the end of the struggle or to fashion a national strategy which will guarantee victory in the sense of the end of communism. What the United States can rationally seek is an eventual modification of the nature of the competition, a gradual change in Soviet policies so that they no longer suppress or threaten the liberty of other nations. Such an outcome—now merely a hope—will depend primarily on developments within the Communist bloc itself, but the process will be influenced, perhaps considerably, by what happens outside, and especially by what America does or does not do.

Negotiation, too, must play its part in the American response to the Communist challenge, both as an arm of strategy and as a means of seeking mutually acceptable arrangements, if only limited and partial ones. The importance of acceptable agreements on such questions as disarmament and Germany is such that a continuing reappraisal of the possibilities and probing of the adversary's positions is necessary. This report cannot go into the detail of possible proposals on specific questions such as Germany. We wish to stress, however, the need for seeking ways to break out of the present impasse. On certain issues the United States has no choice but to stand firm. But there is no status quo which it cannot expect to see, and should not wish to see, changed. The question is how it will be changed. There is nothing sacred about a status quo which denies unity to nations longing for it or subjects peoples to foreign domination. The play of political and other forces keeps the world in a state of flux, especially in those areas where no stable settlements were reached after the Second World War; our problem in negotiation, as in other aspects of carrying out our foreign policy, is not to be left with untenable positions and bankrupt policies as and when the situation changes.

All opportunities for settlement should be exploited, without sacrificing vital interests or concluding agreements in which those interests become dependent solely on the Communists' good faith. Most of these efforts will be fruitless. We do not, however, know how the Soviet and Chinese societies will eventually evolve. The evidence available now does not justify a prediction of basic change, but it is at least possible that time will bring to the fore new elements less dedicated to expansion and more willing to settle outstanding issues with the West; the continuing process of negotiation may even encourage such trends. We should be aware that international alinements are not timeless and unchanging; China's role in another generation, for example, should occupy our attention now, as it must also occupy the attention of the Soviet leadership. Such factors suggest the need to avoid stereotyped images of the Soviet threat and the Moscow-Peiping axis, and to be alert to changing conditions and new opportunities.

Accordingly, it is desirable that channels exist for communication with the Communist regimes. Regardless of what is done or not done on the specific question of recognition, the United States will have to have lines of communication open to the Government of Communist China because it wields power and controls territory which cannot be left out of account. If such a matter as the general control of armaments nears the point of international agreement, Communist China will have to be brought in as a party. In general, the most promising channels for communication with the Soviet Union and Communist China will be regular or ad hoc contacts maintaining the necessary conditions of true negotiation, which may at times be at the highest level, but not public performances of ministers or heads of government.

The strength of the position of the United States and other nations of the free world—their military, political, and economic strength—should contribute to successful negotiation, just as it is necessary for holding vital positions in the competition of "coexistence."

V. The American People and the National Purpose

The American people participate in foreign policy through their influence on the rest of the world, at a time when foreign relations go well beyond official diplomatic contacts between governments, and through their influence on the policies of their own Government and the support which they give to those policies.

The impact of America on most other nations is made not solely or even primarily by official diplomacy but by the massive contact between peoples and cultures that is characteristic of this age: by the expansion of trade and other economic relations; by high-level visits and tourism on the grand scale; by the influence of the press, radio and motion pictures; by the exchange of professors and students, books and ideas across national frontiers; and by the way in which America lives up to the ideals which it sets for itself, for example in respect for human rights and for the principle of nondiscrimination.

These contacts and influences affect public attitudes in foreign countries and sometimes official attitudes and policies as well. They put our own society on display and on trial, as it never has been in the past, before millions all over the world. They will certainly have a bearing on the success of American foreign policy over the next decade. Above all, it is the conduct of American society itself which creates the image of America that is projected abroad and which affects our prestige and leadership.

Much of this nonofficial influence is, of course, beyond the power or the competence of the Government to control. As a free and pluralistic society America speaks not with one voice but with many. Not all its voices will be consistent with the policy of the day. In some ways that is a demonstration of our strength as a free society. In others it raises questions as to whether, as a nation, we know what we want and where we are going. Where the Government can give guidance to this multiplicity of contacts, it should emphasize basic objectives and policies and also standards of personal and international conduct. Where it can properly do so, it should restrain or discourage those elements of the American impact abroad which are clearly harmful to relations with countries important to us or inconsistent with the requirements of leadership. For the rest it will have to depend on the knowledge and self-discipline of the American people themselves.

Even more important than the projection of an image of America abroad is the role of the people in relation to the making of basic policy and in giving it their support. The double series of challenges which this report has described, the Communist threat to the free nations and the manifold problems of a changing world, which at many points fuse into one, will make unprecedented demands upon the United States. However difficult it may be, a democracy such as ours must have the necessary foresight, the ability to organize its policymaking process, and the willingness to commit resources to policies the end results of which are far from clear and certainly unattainable in a short time. It must learn to expect some setbacks and losses, and not to be diverted by them from steady pursuit of the basic objectives. And over the long run the Government must obtain the continuing support of the American people for those objectives and for the policies that they demand—which points up the need for greater public understanding of our world position and for a deeper sense of national purpose.

Through the working of our democratic institutions the people can make their voices heard and heeded on foreign as on domestic affairs; indeed, the two have become inextricably bound up together, and there are now few significant domestic measures which do not affect our foreign relations. Obviously, the people have only an indirect and occasional control over the conduct of foreign policy, but the major decisions, at least in their broad outline, are subject to the normal political process and require congressional and public sanction either before or after they are taken. The Government must be generally responsive to public opinion. It cannot get too far ahead or too far behind. It works under a great handicap if the public is ill informed on the significant issues or if political leaders choose to play domestic politics with them.

Even with greater understanding of foreign affairs, however, will the American people support the necessary policies at the cost of greater sacrifice to themselves? There can be no doubt, we are convinced, of the need for the United States to devote more of its resources than in the past to purposes related to its objectives and its responsibilities in the world. There will be a need, as well, for adjustments in popular thinking, for a greater emphasis on general free world and regional aims rather than the more strictly national ones. Are the American people, now so absorbed in maintaining and enjoying their own material well-being, prepared to support such efforts and to make the necessary adjustments? Are they sufficiently aware of the threats to the Nation's future? Do they have a sense of great purpose, such as the Nation had at earlier critical periods of its history?

This group cannot claim special knowledge of what the American people will or will not do. We are disturbed over signs of a self-centered and shortsighted complacency in the national mood. We are persuaded, however, that with effective leadership the people can be counted on for greater efforts and sacrifices, provided that they have a conception of the immediate and the distant goals.

In war there was no question of their willingness to make sacrifices. In peacetime the American public has accepted the obligations and burdens that go with maintaining a military establishment of unprecedented size. It responded to the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe and to the needs for emergency and continuing assistance elsewhere. What it asks is that the assumption of burdens have some meaning, that it be related to historic and actual American ideals, and that it show a promise of results. For example, the idea of increased "foreign aid," essential though it may be, gets less and less public support in the absence of any clarification of objectives or any change in the prospects of positive and measurable success. The idea of a dramatic, large-scale common effort with other nations for economic development and progress in the entire free world, although more costly, should have a greater chance of evoking an enthusiastic response and continuing public support. The unlimited promise of scientific progress, together with our demonstrated capacity to master it for human needs and welfare in many lands, offers a prospect of positive and effective action for which inspired leadership could hardly fail to call forth inspired popular effort.

Only with a sense of purpose, one which holds deep meaning for the American people but must be given voice by their elected leaders, can the Government of the United States set the goals of foreign policy and work out the means of attaining them. The role of leadership under our democratic form of government can hardly be overemphasized. In times like the present, when world affairs are infinitely complex and the dangers seem intangible or remote to so many, it is a task far more difficult than in time of war. One of the great virtues of the American system has been its power of adaptability to changing circumstances, its capacity to assimilate new ideas and to rise to the challenges of the time. But this is not automatic. The tendency toward relaxation of effort, which may be encouraged by a spurious atmosphere of "peace" or by the narrow concerns of domestic political advantage, must be countered by the farsightedness and plain speaking of America's leaders. The responsibility rests above all on the President, who alone can command the respectful attention of the entire Nation and marshal nationwide support for sacrifices which the situation may demand. The Congress, and especially the Senate, also has a vital role to play in the enlightenment and guidance of public opinion.

Preserving and protecting our freedom and institutions are at the heart of the national purpose. The people should know the magnitude of the threats to their freedom, and that they will shirk the necessary measures to meet and dispel them only at great peril. But America would be blind so to limit its basic aims. It has accepted the fact that its own destiny as a nation depends on the survival and growth of freedom in the world. It must, then, express and pursue aims which respond to the deep aspirations of other peoples and enlist their cooperation, despite all differences of culture and historical experience. Self-interest alone, however enlightened, will not support a role of leadership in the world. Power is a reality in the world politics of today. Diplomacy is an art that cannot be neglected. But leadership cannot rest solely on the strength of America's armed forces or on the skill of its diplomats. It must rest also on principle.

The United States should welcome the cooperation of the Communist powers toward these goals. If it is not forthcoming, as is likely, all the more reason for going ahead in association with nations of the free world, holding the door open but not vitiating the aims or policies or inviting their sabotage for the sake of gaining the participation of those who reject them. For the goals must remain clear enough to sustain their meaning for the American people and for other peoples of the free world.

The United States should represent and set for itself a positive ideal, the ideal of a world not only safer and saner but also one in which basic human needs are met and human values can flourish; a world no longer under threat of nuclear devastation; a world in which broader international authority and institutions can grow as they are needed; a world that, using to the full the fruits of scientific advance, offers expanding productivity and a life more worth living for the millions who find no escape from poverty and the millions more who have begun to climb the ladder but are still looking upward.

If the American people have shown a genius in their own history, it is in the development of political institutions balancing essential freedom and necessary authority, and in the creation of material wealth on a broad basis without coercion. Surely, if we can see the meaning of our national experience in relation to the broader and changing world scene, the goals for the future become clear. The basic challenge is whether we as a people can move toward them with the urgency, the vigor, and the understanding of humanity's needs which are so obviously demanded by the times in which we live.

APPENDIX

STUDY: THE NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD

Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street,
New York, N.Y.

Submission date: November 1, 1959

Purpose.—This study will be concerned with a broad analysis of the basic aims of U.S. foreign policy as they have developed historically, with an estimate of the extent to which those aims are supported by the American people, and with a projection of the role which the United States should play in the future if such basic aims are to be achieved.

OUTLINE OF STUDY

Set forth below are pertinent excerpts from an exchange of correspondence between representatives of the Committee on Foreign Relations and representatives of the Council on Foreign Relations.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.,
New York, N.Y., February 5, 1959.

MR. CARL MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CARL: * * * a Council group might be most helpful to the committee by undertaking to prepare a general statement on the basic objectives and basic policies of the United States as a participant in world affairs, along the lines of "Study I" (pp. 2–3 of your memorandum of October 15, 1958). A statement of this kind might not only set forth the underlying aspirations of American policy, but should also point out some of the ways in which some objectives come into conflict with other important purposes, with the prejudices and purposes of other governments and peoples, and with the limitations on the various types of power which the United States has available or is willing to exert. In some part of the statement the group may wish to make clear the limits which impinge on U.S. power and policy and the importance of not raising the expectations of people at home and abroad too far, beyond a reasonable level of probable performance. At a later time, we will endeavor to draw up a series of points to put before the study group at its first meeting, in order to elicit more fully the views of its experienced and knowledgeable membership on the purpose and contents of this general type of statement.

In terms of procedure, what we have in mind is to call together a relatively small but diversified group of the Council's members, including members from several major regions of the country. Perhaps the group will meet twice during the spring of 1959 in order to outline in some detail the main ideas which it feels can most usefully be set forth in a memorandum of about 30 pages. After one or several drafts have been prepared during the summer, the group will, I assume, plan to hold at least two meetings rather close together in September and October, in order to present this statement on or about November 1, 1959.

I should point out that the Council, as an educational and research organization, never takes positions on public problems, and, indeed, it has no mechanism or procedure by which it could take a position on behalf of its wide-ranging membership. The product of the study group can be presented, however, as a statement of those participating in it and signing it. Perhaps the members will wish to attach a brief note to the effect that while they generally approve this statement as an attempt to state the American interest in world affairs, no one member is necessarily in agreement with each and every point set forth. Other devices for presenting the statement of the study group are also possible, but, in any case, this is a matter which the group itself will wish to discuss and decide. We are confident that many members of the Council, with long experience in governmental responsibilities, business and banking, labor activities abroad, and research and scholarship, will be eager to render this service to our Government.

Dr. Henry M. Wriston, president of the Council and chairman of the committee on studies, has asked me to inform the committee that the Council will be able to provide for the expenses of this study group from its regular budget and will therefore not need to present a draft contract to the committee. All of the Council's activity is directed toward the goal of trying to study and clarify the difficult issues of foreign policy for the sake of a better informed public opinion, and the Council's directors and officers regard this invitation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a very important and challenging part of its program for the coming year.

With all best wishes,

Very sincerely,

PHILIP E. MOSELY,
Director of Studies.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
February 13, 1959.

Dr. PHILIP E. MOSELY,
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR DR. MOSELY: I am delighted to learn that the Council on Foreign Relations will undertake to prepare a general statement on the basic objectives and basic policies of the United States along the general lines set forth in the committee memorandum of October 15, 1958, the relevant portions of which are attached for your ready reference. Assistance of a diversified group such as the Council has a reputation for pulling together will be of tremendous assistance to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The general considerations which you set forth in your letter of February 5, 1959, to Mr. Marcy are completely satisfactory to us. I do hope that your group can give some consideration to what might be described as the influence of domestic factors (such as our educational system, our movies, and in general the image we present abroad) upon our foreign policy posture.

I look forward to the time when the final statement will be presented. Please feel free to call upon the committee or its staff at any time when we can be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

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